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I. INTRODUCTION
After his wife became pregnant, Vannak Prum left their home in
Cambodia and crossed over the border to Thailand, as thousands do each
year, hoping to find work and return in a few months with enough money to
pay the hospital bills.1 Prum spent the next three years on a Thai fishing boat
working twenty-hour days against his will.2 He witnessed the beatings and
murders of fellow slaves while harvesting mackerel and sardines that make
up twenty percent of the American market for those fish.3 Similar means are
used in the Thai shrimp industry, the largest in the world, which relies on
slave labor in the farming and harvesting of shrimp that is sold at the four
largest global retailers in the world: Walmart, Carrefour, Costco, and Tesco.4
Shyima Hall, an Egyptian author and activist working to combat human
trafficking, was sold when she was eight years old to another Egyptian
family that moved to California and forced her to work for up to twenty
hours a day for four years, suffering physical and verbal assaults.5 Domestic
workers in the Middle East, India, and around the world are unexpectedly
thrown into this thinly veiled cycle of slavery.6 In Paris, the “City of Light,”
there are thousands of household slaves, lured from North Africa by
promises of a French education in return for au pair services.7 In reality, the
girls are domestic slaves, held under threat of violent beatings and sexual
assault, in a state of malnutrition and poor health, to serve their
“employers.”8

1 Vannak Prum, Slavery at Sea, RADIO FREE ASIA (2011), http://www.rfa.org/english/ne
ws/special/HumanTrafficking/vannak.html; Shannon Service & Becky Palmstrom, Confined
To a Thai Fishing Boat, For Three Years, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 19, 2012, 3:06 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2012/06/19/155045295/confined-to-a-thai-fishing-boat-for-three-years.
2 See Service & Palmstrom, supra note 1.
3 See id.
4 Kate Hodal, Chris Kelly & Felicity Lawrence, Revealed: Asian Slave Labour Producing
Prawns For Supermarkets in US, UK, THE GUARDIAN, June 10, 2014, http://www.theguardi
an.com/global-development/2014/jun/10/supermarket-prawns-thailand-produced-slave-labour.
5 DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 21 (2014), http://www.state.gov/docu
ments/organization/226844.pdf.
6 Id. at 23, 28.
7 KEVIN BALES, DISPOSABLE PEOPLE: NEW SLAVERY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1–4 (3d ed.
2012).
8 See id.
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Brahima Male was twelve years old when he was offered work in Cote
d’Ivoire.9 Once across the border from Mali, he was sold for less than thirty
U.S. dollars to a cocoa farmer.10 The use of forced child labor in the cocoa
industry of West Africa is well documented.11 Poor Malian children are
promised money and jobs but are instead sold into slavery in Cote d’Ivoire
and Ghana to work without pay under the constant threat of violence in order
to harvest the cocoa that provides seventy percent of the world’s chocolate. 12
When the widespread use of child slaves on cocoa farms was uncovered by a
Knight Ridder Newspapers investigation in 2001, the industry mounted a
successful lobbying campaign to defeat proposed legislation that would
require the industry to certify their products as “slave free.”13 Meanwhile, in
America, children are sold the idea that uncommonly talented elves residing
in an uncommonly outfitted Hollow Tree® are responsible for the production
of chocolate and cookies.14 In an advertisement “sure to melt the hearts of
audiences everywhere,” Nestle Toll House sounds the call to “bake the world
a better place.”15
Human trafficking and forced labor occur in many contexts around the
world. In the United States, temporary workers are exploited on farms for
little or no pay yet are unable to leave without money or documents, and are

9 Sudarsan Raghavan, Two Boys Tell of Descent Into Slavery, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
June 25, 2001, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20050215094139/http://www.jsonl
ine.com:80/bym/news/jun01/slave26062501.asp.
10 Id.
11 See, e.g., Miki Mistrati & Roberto Romano, The Dark Side of Chocolate, TOP
DOCUMENTARY FILMS (2010), http://topdocumentaryfilms.com/dark-side-chocolate/; Sudarsan
Raghavan & Sumana Chatterjee, A Taste of Slavery, KNIGHT RIDDER NEWSPAPERS, June 24,
2001, http://web.archive.org/web/20060917014323/http://vision.ucsd.edu/~kbranson/stopcho
colateslavery/atasteofslavery.html.
12 Raghavan, supra note 9.
13 Sumana Chatterjee, Chocolate Firms Launch Fight Against ‘Slave Free’ Labels:
Chocolate Firms Fight ‘Slave Free’ Effort, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 1, 2001, http://articles.phill
y.com/2001-08-01/news/25298857_1_cocoa-farms-chocolate-industry-child-slaves.
14 See generally KEEBLER, http://www.keebler.com; The Museum of Classic Chicago
Television, Keebler Cookies – “Oh, Fudge!,” YOUTUBE (1980), https://www.youtube.com/w
atch?v=oUs2lxOxpMQ.
15 Sylvia G, JWT & Nestle “Bake The World a Better Place” in Newest Ad For Toll House
Cookies, GREAT-ADS (Sept. 19, 2013), http://great-ads.blogspot.com/2013/09/jwt-nestle-bakeworld-better-place-in.html.
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often unknowingly violating the terms of their temporary work permits.16
Workers participating in the H-2 guest worker program have complained of a
wide variety of threats and coercion, including wage theft, beatings, rape,
starvation, and imprisonment.17 The number and variety of sex trafficking
victims in America and around the world defy simple categorization. More
than four million women and children are victims of sex trafficking,
including those from less-developed parts of the world like Southeast Asia
and the former Soviet Union, but also hundreds of thousands of American
youth.18 Sex trafficking is the third largest criminal enterprise in the world,
behind drugs and arms dealing.19
Estimates of the number of people suffering as victims of human
trafficking vary widely, as the illegal nature of the practice keeps
authoritative data hidden.20 In its 2012 report, the United Nations’
International Labour Organization (ILO) estimated 20.9 million people are
victims of human trafficking around the world; a conservative estimate that
stands in stark contrast to the ILO’s previous “minimum estimate” of 12.3
million people in 2005.21 This means there are more slaves today than at any
other time in human history.22 Alarmingly, there are more slaves living
today than the total number of people taken from Africa as part of the
transatlantic slave trade that lasted from the sixteenth to nineteenth century.23
16 Claire Goforth, How U.S. Guest-Worker Program Helps Keep Human Trafficking Alive,
ORLANDO WKLY., Sept. 9, 2014, http://orlandoweekly.com/news/how-u-s-guest-worker-progr
am-helps-keep-human-trafficking-alive-1.1750167.
17 Jessica Garrison, Ken Bensinger & Jeremy Singer-Vine, The New American Slavery:
Invited to the U.S., Foreign Workers Find a Nightmare, BUZZFEED, July 24, 2015, http://
www.buzzfeed.com/jessicagarrison/the-new-american-slavery-invited-to-the-us-foreign-work
ers-f#.yxy9rb12b9.
18 See generally Amanda Walker-Rodriguez & Rodney Hill, Human Sex Trafficking,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN (Mar. 2011), https://leb.
fbi.gov/2011/march/human-sex-trafficking (discussing the global problem as well as national
statistics).
19 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, An Introduction to Human Trafficking: Vulnerability,
Impact and Action (2008), https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/An_Introduc
tion_to_Human_Trafficking_-_Background_Paper.pdf.
20 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, ILO GLOBAL ESTIMATE OF FORCED LABOR: RESULTS &
METHODOLOGY 11 (2012), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm
/@declaration/documents/publication/wcms_182004.pdf.
21 Id. at 11–13.
22 FREE THE S LAVES, https://www.freetheslaves.net/page.aspx?pid=301; BALES, supra note
7, at 8–10.
23 BALES, supra note 7, at 9.
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What all of these examples have in common is the potential to have their
harms redressed through civil litigation in the United States. When
American citizens and American businesses benefit financially from
trafficking and forced labor—here or around the worldthere exists a
possibility for civil relief. As one of the largest and most powerful
economies in the world, it is unsurprising that much of the financial benefit
from this global activity lands in the United States. However, when it does,
the possibility of redress should land with it as well.
This Note will focus on the use of civil litigation in America to address
human trafficking violations around the world. Specifically, this Note will
address how the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008
(TVPRA)24 provides the much needed tools to overcome some of the
restraints apparent from recent decisions that limit the effectiveness of
victims seeking accountability through the Alien Torts Statute (ATS).25 Part
II will examine the beginnings of civil litigation under the ATS with the
Filartiga decision,26 the first Supreme Court case utilizing the statute after
nearly 200 years of inactivity. Part II will then discuss modern litigation
under the ATS as a means of combatting human rights violations, focusing
on the ways in which the ATS has been used in the past and how its scope
and utility has been narrowed through recent Supreme Court decisions. Part
III proposes the TVPRA, amended in significant ways in 2008, as a better
path in combatting a broad array of human rights violations in light of the
hurdles now apparent in litigation under the ATS. Part IV will address
impediments and challenges such an approach could face. Part V will
compare two recent ATS cases and determine whether the TVPRA would
have been a more successful vehicle for those suits.
II. FILARTIGA, SOSA & KIOBEL: THE RISE & REDUCTION OF THE ATS
Under the ATS, U.S. district courts have “original jurisdiction [over] any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
24 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008) [hereinafter TVPRA] (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. 1590).
25 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). This Note uses the phrase “Alien Tort Statute” or ATS, to
maintain consistency with Supreme Court usage. See, e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct.
2278, 2282 (2010); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 446, 472 (2004).
26 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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nations or a treaty of the United States.”27 The statute has been used to bring
litigation seeking to broaden the scope of accountability around the world for
human rights abuses, but the few U.S. Supreme Court cases interpreting the
ATS have limited its applicability in important ways. This section will
examine the beginnings of litigation under the ATS in modern times with an
examination of the Filartiga decision. Next, this section will discuss the
limitations of the ATS as a tool for victims of human rights abuses in light of
the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Sosa and Kiobel.28
A. Filartiga and the Birth of Civil Litigation To Combat Human Rights
Violations
The modern American starting point for utilizing civil litigation as a tool
to combat human rights violations is Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, a case in which
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Second Circuit)
resurrected the ATS—a statute that had lain practically dormant for nearly
two centuries.29 The ATS was enacted by the First Congress in 1789 to grant
original jurisdiction to district courts over “any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.”30 This brief but sweeping jurisdictional act was designed to
allow foreign nationals to sue either another foreign national or a U.S.
citizen. However, the ATS was only successfully invoked twice between the
First Congress and the inauguration of Ronald Reagan.31 Interpreting the
“law of nations” as synonymous to customary international law, the Filartiga
Court resurrected the ATS as a possible vehicle for addressing human rights
violations around the world.32
In Filartiga, Dolly Filartiga brought suit against Americo Norberto PenaIrala for the wrongful death of her brother, Joelito Filartiga. 33 Both citizens
of Paraguay, Dolly charged Pena-Irala, the Inspector General of Police in
27

28 U.S.C. § 1350.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
29 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
30 Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587 (2002);
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
31 See Bradley, supra note 30, at 588; Peter Jan Honigsberg, In Search of a Forum for the
Families of the Guantanamo Disappeared, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 433, 456 (2012).
32 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880–83.
33 Id. at 878.
28

458

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 44:451

Asunción, Paraguay, with kidnapping and torturing Joelito to death in
1976.34 In 1978, Dolly moved to Washington D.C. under a visitor’s visa and
began seeking permanent political asylum in the United States.35 Shortly
thereafter, she learned of Pena-Irala’s own relocation to Brooklyn, NY.36
Dolly quickly contacted the Immigration and Naturalization Service and filed
suit.37 Pena-Irala was ordered deported, an order that was stayed by the
district court judge.38 However, the district court dismissed the action for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the ATS did not provide federal
jurisdiction, and Pena-Irala was returned to Paraguay.39
The Filartiga Court found that an act of torture by state officials clearly
violated the norms of international law and, in doing so, found, “it is clear
that courts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has
evolved and exists among the nations of the world today.”40 The Second
Circuit concluded that the ATS was consistent with Article III of the
Constitution because “[t]he constitutional basis for the [ATS] is the law of
nations, which has always been part of the federal common law.”41 The
court succinctly swatted away objections that the ATS was an improper basis
for jurisdiction, stating, “[t]his is undeniably an action by an alien, for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations.”42
Thus, Filartiga opened the door for international human rights violations
to be litigated in U.S. courts. Since 1980, hundreds of suits have been
brought in the United States alleging a variety of human rights violations
around the world.43

34

Id.
Id.
36 Id. at 878–79.
37 Id. at 879.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 880.
40 Id. at 881.
41 Id. at 885.
42 Id. at 887.
43 See, e.g., Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir.
2009) (“cruel, degrading, and inhumane treatment,” denied on forum non conveniens
grounds); Hilao v. Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (torture,
execution, and disappearance); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995)
(torture, execution, and arbitrary detention); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845 (11th
Cir. 1996) (torture); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1995) (genocide).
35
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B. How the ATS Has Been Blunted by U.S. Courts
The Supreme Court has chosen to limit the jurisdictional scope of the
ATS on the two occasions it has reviewed the statute.44 In Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, the Court narrowed the interpretation of customary international
norms, limiting the universe of potential causes of action available under the
ATS.45 In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Court restricted the
jurisdictional reach of the statute, holding that the ATS was not
presumptively extraterritorial.46 However, the Court left the door slightly
open on the issue of how much and what type of conduct within the United
States was necessary to overcome the presumption against
extraterritoriality.47 In dicta, the Court noted additional potential restraints
on the use of the ATS in both cases, including the possibility of an
exhaustion of remedies requirement, susceptibility to a forum non conveniens
challenge, and the still undecided question of whether the law of nations
recognizes corporate liabilitythe question Kiobel was originally expected
to answer.48 This section examines the Sosa and Kiobel decisions in turn,
with an eye toward the sharply reduced scope of cases to which the ATS now
applies.
1. Sosa: Norms of International Law
In Sosa, the Court affirmed the basic nature of the ATS as “a
jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action.”49 This affirmation
upheld the jurisdictional reach of the ATS to cases which are found to violate
international norms, but at the same time greatly contracted its scope by
44

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 737–38 (2004); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
45 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 736–38.
46 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663–69.
47 Id.
48 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21 (stating the Court would consider the exhaustion requirement
in a more appropriate case); Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663 (granting certiorari to review the
Second Circuit’s dismissal of an ATS claim on the basis that the law of nations does not
recognize corporate liability despite ultimately deciding the case on extraterritorial grounds);
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 69 F. Supp. 3d 75, 89 (D.D.C. 2014) (Exxon failed to prove its
burden of an alternative forum sufficient for the court to consider a forum non conveniens
challenge); Villeda Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th
Cir. 2009) (dismissal of ATS and TVPA claims on forum non conveniens grounds).
49 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
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defining international norms as “a relatively modest set of actions” similar to
the three universally agreed upon norms understood at the time of the
statute’s enactment in 1789.50 The offenses cited by the Court as paradigms
of eighteenth century offenses of common law were the violation of safe
conducts, piracy, and the infringement of ambassador’s rights.51 The Court
endorsed The Paquete Habana analysis of international law:
[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of
these, to the works of jurists and commentators . . . not for the
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to
be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.52
In Sosa, this limitation to international norms defeated the plaintiff’s claim that
arbitrary arrest rose to the level of violating customary international law.53
Later cases noted the call for restraint in applying modern international
law, however, the analysis set forth in Sosa has been interpreted as
“suggestive rather than precise.”54 Defining this standard has proven
difficult.55 In attempting to enunciate a set of standards, the Court relied on a
grab bag of earlier articulations that the limits of the ATS could be defined
within “a handful of heinous actions—each of which violates definable,
universal and obligatory norms”;56 “[a]ctionable violations of international
50

Id. at 720.
Id. at 724–25, 732 (“[F]ederal courts should not recognize claims under federal common
law for violations of any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance
among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted.”).
52 Id. at 734.
53 Id. at 695.
54 Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting courts must
exercise restraint in applying contemporary international law in an ATS case); Flomo v.
Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The Court’s effort at
definition illustrates rather than solves the problems of notice and legitimacy and is best
understood as the statement of a mood—and the mood is one of caution.”).
55 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“Recognizing that Congress enacted the ATS to permit recovery of damages from
pirates and others who violated basic international law norms as understood in 1789, Sosa
essentially leads today’s judges to ask: Who are today’s pirates?”).
56 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732–33 (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774
(D.C. Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51
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law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory”;57 “[a]nd the
determination of whether a norm is sufficiently definite to support a cause of
action should (and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an element of judgment
about the practical consequences of making that cause available to litigants
in the federal courts.”58 Later cases have cited the “specific, universal, and
obligatory” language as a workable definition and attempted to cite further
authoritative sources of international law to determine whether the standard
is met.59
Although an arbitrary arrest—as in Sosa—is now clearly not considered a
customary norm of international law, suits alleging more obvious violations
of human rights have continued.60 Sosa limited the possible causes of action
available to a plaintiff and called on courts to consider the potential flood of
litigants to federal courts without such limitations.61 While this limitation
shrinks the scope of potential future litigation, many human trafficking
violations such as forced labor and sex trafficking remain within customary
international norms.62
2. Kiobel: “Touch and Concern”
In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court struck a near fatal blow to the use of the
ATS to address human rights violations around the world. In Kiobel,
Nigerian nationals residing in the United States sued Dutch, British, and
Nigerian corporations under the ATS for aiding and abetting the Nigerian
government in violations of the law of nations.63 The unanimous decision in
Kiobel answered the question of whether the ATS presumptively applied
extraterritorially—it does not.64 However, by not reaching the merits, Kiobel

57

Id. at 732.
Id. at 732–33 (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir.
1984), and In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th
Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
59 Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1019 (citing In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig.,
25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994)).
60 Id. at 1022; Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 69 F. Supp. 3d 75, 90 (D.D.C. 2014).
61 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732–33.
62 Id. at 732.
63 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1660 (2013).
64 Id.
58
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failed to provide a clear rule from the Court as to whether the ATS may be
applied to corporations as well as states.65
This ruling essentially precludes all claims a victim of human trafficking
or forced labor may have against a non-U.S. corporation. The Kiobel ruling
left open the possibility that a claim could “touch and concern” the United
States with “sufficient force to displace the presumption against
extraterritorial application,” but noted that the amount of force necessary
must be greater than “mere corporate presence.”66 Thus, alien suits against
foreign corporations would most likely be impossible to maintain against
corporations lacking substantial ties to the United States that implicate the
specific claims in question.
Commentators are divided on the impact of Kiobel on the future of ATS
litigation.67 From a practical perspective, it is difficult to be optimistic about
the scope of ATS litigation post-Kiobel, even if the issue of corporate
liability remains undecided. While it is true that there is still room for
litigation of territorial violations of international law under the ATS, in the
context of human trafficking in corporate supply chains and many forced
labor claims, the most egregious and widespread violations of human
trafficking norms occur beyond the territory of the United States. Few
corporations large enough to have major international activities routinely
implement workplace conditions within the United States that violate
international norms because of the great body of existing domestic
legislation and case law aimed at protecting workers.68 What Kiobel
65 Id. at 1663. The Second Circuit initially dismissed the complaint in Kiobel on the
reasoning that the law of nations does not recognize corporate liability, however, this issue
was ultimately not reached as the Court decided the case on extraterritorial grounds. Id.
66 Id. at 1669. In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer noted that the corporations were
traded on the New York Stock Exchange but “[t]heir only presence in the United States
consists of an office in New York City (actually owned by a separate but affiliated company)
that helps to explain their business to potential investors.” Id. at 1677 (Breyer, J., concurring).
67 See Matteo M. Winkler, What Remains of the Alien Tort Statute After Kiobel?, 39 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 171, 172–73 (2013) (finding “not much to fear” in a post-Kiobel
landscape because it only eliminates suits against foreign defendants for foreign conduct and
leaves the issue of corporate liability unsettled while noting former U.N. Secretary General’s
Special Representative for Business and Human Rights John G. Ruggie’s prediction that
“there would be little if anything left of the ATS” if the court found for the defendants, as it
did).
68 See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678; Minimum Wage
29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219. But see Ruiz v. Fernandez, 949 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1076 (E.D. Wash.
2013) (migrant workers in the United States); Ramos-Madrigal v. Mendiola Forestry Serv.,
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encourages is the further distancing of U.S. corporations between their
activities abroad and their corporate headquarters in America by decreasing
oversight and increasing the layers of subsidiary and supplier separation.
This perversely incentivizes corporate willful blindness, which could be
accomplished by the home office concerning itself only with dictating prices
and allowing foreign suppliers to concern themselves with the means
necessary to achieve the agreed-upon price point.69
However, as noted above, the touch and concern test has left the door of
opportunity partially open for litigants who are able to state a claim with
sufficient plausibility that conduct in the United States substantially relates to
their ATS claim. Circuit courts are now grappling with the meaning of the
touch and concern test, and four circuit courts have addressed the issue thus
far.70 The Eleventh and Second Circuits are in agreement that corporate
citizenship—a greater connection than mere presence—is not enough to
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality under the ATS.71 The
types of additional facts sufficient to overcome the presumption against
extraterrioriality have only begun to be discussed at the circuit level.
In Al Shimari, the Fourth Circuit found the presumption against
extraterritoriality was displaced in a suit alleging acts of torture at the Abu
Ghraib prison in Iraq.72 The court found substantial connections between the
United States and the unlawful conduct because the torture was committed
by U.S. citizens employed by a U.S. corporation, pursuant to a contract with
LLC, 799 F. Supp. 2d 958, 960 (W.D. Ark. 2011) (migrant workers); David v. Signal Int’l,
LLC, No. CIV.A. 08-1220, 2014 WL 5489359, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2014) (temporary
construction workers post-Katrina); Sulastri v. Halsey, No. CV 12-3538 (JS)(ARL), 2014 WL
4904718, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2014), report and recommendation adopted by, No. 12CV-3538 (JS)(ARL), 2014 WL 4904527 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014) (worker recruited from
Indonesia to work in couple’s basement shoe company).
69 Raghavan & Chatterjee, supra note 11; Hodal, Kelley & Lawrence, supra note 4. This is
essentially what plaintiffs and nationals in the affected countries are now arguing, that the
only way to provide the products—fish meal or chocolate—at the dictated prices is to
continue the practice of forced labor. In the case of the Thai shrimping industry, as more Thai
citizens enter the middle class, less are amenable to the conditions of the fishing boats and the
boat captains are faced with a labor shortfall which they fill with slave labor to meet the
quantity and price demands of the current market. Hodal, Kelley & Lawrence, supra note 4.
70 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 69 F. Supp. 3d 75, 94–95 (D.D.C. 2014); Al Shimari v.
CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 520 (4th Cir. 2014); Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727
F.3d 174, 189–90 (2d Cir. 2013); Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1191
(11th Cir. 2014); Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 189 (2d Cir. 2014).
71 Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 189; Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1189.
72 Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 520.
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the U.S. government at a U.S. military facility.73 The D.C. Circuit cited Al
Shimari favorably, agreeing that U.S. corporate citizenship by itself was not
enough, but “when plaintiffs allege U.S. based conduct itself constituting a
violation of the ATS” then the presumption against extraterritoriality is
overcome.74 Thus, the touch and concern test is met in the D.C. and Fourth
Circuits when there is relevant conduct committed in the United States that
indicates “knowledge and encouragement of international law violations
abroad.”75
In Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., the Second Circuit found the presumption
against extraterritoriality overcome through the touch and concern test in a
case that alleged the U.S. oil company and French bank maintained accounts
and made payments routed through U.S. accounts that transmitted kickbacks
to Saddam Hussein’s regime.76 Still, this is a much more difficult standard
for plaintiffs to meet, even though courts have been accommodating in
allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaints in light of the Kiobel ruling.77
III. HOW THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION REAUTHORIZATION ACT
(2008) OVERCOMES THE LIMITATIONS OF THE ATS
The TVPRA, though open to criticism on a number of grounds, addresses
many of the specific shortcomings exposed in recent litigation under the
ATS.78 The 2008 amendments expressly gave the act extraterritorial
jurisdiction.79 The amended act created a civil claim, in addition to the
original criminal liability, against anyone who “knowingly benefits” from a
venture which the defendant “knew or should have known” included acts
which violate the TVPRA.80 The causes of action under the TVPRA are
specifically defined, and include a wide array of potential activity that
violates human rights around the world.81

73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id. at 528–29.
Exxon, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 95.
Id.
Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 189–90 (2d Cir. 2014).
Exxon, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 96.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1589–1596.
Id. § 1596.
Id. § 1595.
Id. § 1589.
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A. Express Extraterritoriality
As an initial matter, the TVPRA explicitly became extraterritorial in
jurisdiction through the 2008 amendments. The only remaining limitation on
jurisdiction is that an alleged offender must be either a U.S. national, a
permanent resident alien, or at least present in the United States.82 This
amendment has been interpreted as a congressional response to decisions
such as Roe v. Bridgestone, where the trial court dismissed civil lawsuits
alleging violations in Liberia, stating that absent a clear congressional intent,
legislation “is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.”83
At least one U.S. District Court has found a limitation on the
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the TVPRA.84 Finding the creation of
jurisdiction a substantive rather than procedural rule (in contrast to a transfer
of existing jurisdiction) the U.S District Court for the Southern District of
Texas held the presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction applied to the
TVPRA.85 Thus, the amendment granting extraterritorial jurisdiction was
not given retroactive effect.86 Should this interpretation of § 1596 stand, the
practical effect would be to limit the reach of the statute’s jurisdiction to
extraterritorial action occurring after 2008.
B. Limitations of Sosa to Claims that Violate International Norms
The causes of action under the TVPRA are limited to claims defined as
sex trafficking and forced labor.87
However, these definitions are
intentionally broad and include many types of mistreatment and coercion that
go beyond the limited causes of action under the ATS.88 In the criminal
82

18 U.S.C. § 1596(a) (2008).
Kathleen Kim, The Trafficked Worker As Private Attorney General: A Model for
Enforcing the Civil Rights of Undocumented Workers, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 247, 298–99 (2009);
John Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
84 Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 994 F. Supp. 2d 831 (S.D. Tex. 2014).
85 Id. at 839.
86 Id. at 840. See also Cruz v. Maypa, 981 F. Supp. 2d 485, 488 (E.D. Va. 2013) (finding
the TVPRA’s ten-year statute of limitations, added in 2008, also does not apply retroactively).
But see Camayo v. John Peroulis & Sons Sheep, Inc., No. 10-CV-00772-MSK-MJW, 2013
WL 3927677, at *2 (D. Colo. July 30, 2013) (applying the ten-year statute of limitations
retroactively as a new procedural rule).
87 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1591 (2008).
88 Id. § 1589.
83
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context, defendants have consistently urged courts to construe the elements
of the TVPRA narrowly; however, courts have instead consistently opted for
broader interpretations of the statute.89 A look at the interlocking definitions
of some of the TVPRA’s key terms shows that the actions Congress intended
to capture with the TVPRA are potentially broader than critics of the act
have previously indicated. For example, “severe forms of trafficking in
persons” is defined by the TVPRA as:
(A) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is
induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the
person induced to perform such act has not attained 18
years of age; or
(B) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision,
or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the
use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of
subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt
bondage or slavery.90
The TVPRA of 2008 further defined forced labor as occurring:
(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical
restraint, or threats of physical restraint to that
person or another person;
(2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious
harm to that person or another person;
(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of
law or legal process; or
(4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern
intended to cause the person to believe that, if that
person did not perform such labor or services, that

89 Mohamed Y. Mattar, Interpreting Judicial Interpretations of the Criminal Statutes of the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act: Ten Years Later, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
1247, 1267–68 (2011); United States v. Dann, 652 F.3d 1160, 1169 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting the
“increasingly subtle” means used by modern traffickers and the broad definition of “harm”).
90 22 U.S.C. § 7102 (2013).
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person or another person would suffer serious
harm or physical restraint.91
Finally, the legislature defined “serious harm” as
[A]ny harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including
psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is
sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to
compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the
same circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor
or services in order to avoid incurring that harm.92
Due to the expanded scope of liability in the TVPRA to anyone who
knowingly benefits from the above violations, the universe of potential
defendants was increased beyond primary tortfeasors and even beyond those
aiding and abetting a violation of these sections. Courts have found that
threats of deportation, withholding of documents, intentional manipulation,
and indebtedness to an employer that makes escape unreasonably difficult,
are all allegations that may constitute “serious harm” under the statute.93
The addition of the “serious harm” definition in 2008 is significant to the
TVPRA’s potential causes of action. The definition inserts a subjective
element in the ostensibly objective standard—finding serious harm to be any
physical or nonphysical harm “sufficiently serious . . . to compel a
reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to
perform or to continue performing labor” to avoid the harm.94 This is a
much wider net than the “force, fraud, or coercion” limitations of the original
act and considers “all the surrounding circumstances” from the perspective
of a similarly situated victim.95 In the criminal context, serious harm was
found to include an employer’s threat to a live-in housekeeper of owing the
employer $8,000 should the housekeeper leave her job.96 The inclusion of
91

18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2008).
Id.
93 Franco v. Diaz, 51 F. Supp. 3d 235, 246 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (deportation); Ruiz v.
Fernandez, 949 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1076–77 (E.D. Wash. 2013) (documents); Nuñag-Tanedo v.
E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (intentional
manipulation and indebtedness).
94 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2) (2008).
95 United States v. Dann, 652 F.3d 1160, 1169 (9th Cir. 2011).
96 Id. at 1162.
92
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psychological harm in the definition of serious harm could incorporate a
number of instances in which threats were used to induce a person to conduct
“labor or services” (the meaning of which is discussed below), and should be
capable of capturing causes of action that go far beyond international norms
to include unfair, manipulative, or abusive work practices around the
world.97
C. The Plain Meaning of the TVPRA Includes Corporations
Kiobel left undecided whether the ATS applies to corporations.98 There
is, however, no such ambiguity in the TVPRA. The 2008 amendments
broadened the scope of the TVPRA to include a cause of action against
“[w]hoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value
from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have
known has engaged in” forced labor or sex trafficking as defined in the act.99
For purposes of § 1591, the TVPRA further defines “venture” as “any group
of two or more individuals associated in fact, whether or not a legal
entity.”100 While § 1591 is limited specifically to “sex trafficking of children
or by force, fraud, or coercion,” it would be unexceptional to infer that courts
would use this definitionas some courts have101throughout the statute
when applying the “usual presumption that the same words repeated in
different parts of the same statute have the same meaning.”102 Whether those
organizations are of an informal nature or of a legal nature as in the case of
corporations,103 the ordinary meaning of the language specifically includes
individuals and groups.
In recent years, district court cases from around the country have
routinely allowed claims to be alleged against companies and corporations of
various types since the amendments were enacted. In Panwar v. Access
Therapies, Inc., a foreign national was found to have properly stated a claim
97

Kiwanuka v. Bakilana, 844 F. Supp. 2d 107, 114 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding yelling and
threats of deportation sufficient psychological harms).
98 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663.
99 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2008).
100 Id. § 1591(e)(5).
101 La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Hershey Co., No. CA 7996-ML, 2013 WL 6120439,
at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 2013).
102 Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 584 (2007); Atl. Cleaners & Dyers v.
United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932).
103 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(5) (2008).
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under the TVPRA for violations by an Indiana corporation for failure to pay,
coercion, and threats of financial harm.104 In Nuñag-Tanedo v. East Baton
Rouge Parish School Board, Filipino nationals alleged a claim against a
teacher-recruitment firm that threatened financial consequences and
deportation.105 The defendants in Sulastri v. Halsey included a married
couple and their corporation, which used an Indonesian staffing company to
find labor for the corporation.106 Similarly, the plaintiffs in David v. Signal
International, LLC successfully alleged under the TVPRA threats of serious
financial harm by the defendant limited liability corporation.107 Thus far, in
recent cases, many of which have only reached preliminary rulings on
summary judgment motions, none of the defendant corporations have
asserted that the TVPRA does not apply to corporations. The plain language
of the statute supports this interpretation.
IV. POTENTIAL IMPEDIMENTS WITHIN THE TVPRA
The most significant shortcoming of the TVPRA in addressing broad
human rights violations in the place of the ATS is the likely exclusion of
much noneconomic activity previously thought actionable under the ATS.
Implicit support for military and paramilitary activity or acts of otherwise
indiscriminate killing likely would not satisfy the purposeful coercion aspect
of the TVPRA discussed below. However, even within the wide scope of
human trafficking captured by the statute, the TVPRA has been criticized for
not going as far as other international measures.108

104 Panwar v. Access Therapies, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 2d 948, 957–58 (S.D. Ind. 2013),
reconsideration denied, No. 1:12-CV-00619-TWP-TAB, 2014 WL 2882914 (S.D. Ind. June
25, 2014).
105 Nuñag-Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138–39 (C.D.
Cal. 2011).
106 Sulastri v. Halsey, No. CV 12-3538 (JS)(ARL), 2014 WL 4904718, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.
21, 2014), report and recommendation adopted by, No. 12-CV-3538 (JS)(ARL), 2014 WL
4904527 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014).
107 David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, No. CIV. A. 08-1220, 2014 WL 5489359, at *5 (E.D. La.
Aug. 13, 2014).
108 Mattar, supra note 89, at 1294–96.
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A. “Severe” Forms of Human Trafficking and the Palermo Protocol
The Trafficking Victims Protection Act was originally passed in 2000 as
similar statutory measures were being passed around the world.109 The
statute has been viewed as an implementation of the U.N. Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children (Palermo Protocol), which required the adoption of specific
anti-trafficking statutes by States.110 Though U.S. courts have interpreted the
TVPRA’s prohibition on forced labor more broadly than defendants have
urged, the Act’s statutory definition of “severe forms of human trafficking”
has been criticized as being narrower than the Palermo Protocol.111 The
TVPRA’s requirement of proving force, fraud, or coercion is not necessary
under the Palermo Protocol, which further defines trafficking to include “the
abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability” and states that consent
expressed by a person in such a vulnerable condition is irrelevant.112
Conversely, the TVPRA has been criticized as leaving in place the idea that a
trafficked person would remain able to consent up to the point of severe
force or coercion.113 Thus, while the TVPRA was a landmark in creating a
comprehensive statutory regime for prosecuting human trafficking
violations, the Act could have further expanded the statute’s reach beyond
“severe” forms of human trafficking. However, in light of the broad
interpretation of the Act’s “coercion” and “serious harm” definitions added
in 2008, as well as the inclusion in the amendments of “threats of force” as a
severe form of trafficking, the functionality of the TVPRA is such that a

109

See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 22, 27 & 42 U.S.C.); Mattar,
supra note 89, at 1294.
110 Mattar, supra note 89, at 1294.
111 Id. at 1295; 22 U.S.C. § 7102.
112 United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, supplementing, the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. Doc. A/Res/55/25, Annex II (Dec. 25,
2003), art. 3(a), 3(b); Karin Dryhurst, Liability Up the Supply Chain: Corporate Accountability
for Labor Trafficking, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 641, 645–46 (2013).
113 Jane Kim, Note, Trafficked: Domestic Violence, Exploitation in Marriage, and the
Foreign-Bride Industry, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 443, 492 (2011).
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large portion of the targeted behaviors and violations are captured in its
statutory net.114
B. The “Knowing” Standard
In an age of complex global supply chains, one of the most practical
difficulties of alleging a violation of the TVPRA is proving the knowledge
standard. The TVPRA allows for civil liability against “whoever knowingly
benefits” from a venture which has engaged in forced labor if those parties
were in “knowing or reckless disregard of the fact that the venture has
engaged in the providing or obtaining of labor or services” in violation of the
TVPRA.115 Again, in terms of the modern global supply chain, it is unlikely
that major corporate interests would have knowingly and directly engaged in
human trafficking.116 However, it remains unknown precisely how much
involvement with a company’s suppliers would be necessary to prove a
reckless disregard standard.117 Since the civil cause of action under the
TVPRA was established, there have been a distressingly low number of
cases brought under the statute; and thus, a lack of case law that has reached
the merits from which to draw conclusions.118
Some criteria have been set forth by commentators for determining
whether a corporation knew or should have known about trafficking
violations by suppliers. These include: the terms of the labor contractor
agreement, the reasons behind a company externalizing part of its labor force
in the first place, and whether the company had any reasonable notice of
possible labor trafficking violations.119
While allowing for greater
114 Theodore R. Sangalis, Comment, Elusive Empowerment: Compensating the Sex
Trafficked Person Under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 403,
423 (2011).
115 18 U.S.C. § 1589(b), (d) (2008).
116 See generally Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014) (“This is
not to say that the purpose standard is satisfied merely because the defendants intended to
profit by doing business in the Ivory Coast. Doing business with child slave owners, however
morally reprehensible that may be, does not by itself demonstrate a purpose to support child
slavery.”); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 69 F. Supp. 3d 75, 97 (D.D.C. 2014) (allowing
plaintiffs an opportunity to amend pleadings in light of Kiobel to state a clearer claim of
liability as to Exxon).
117 Dryhurst, supra note 112, at 661–62.
118 Id. at 672–73; Jennifer S. Nam, Note, The Case of the Missing Case: Examining the Civil
Right of Action for Human Trafficking Victims, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1655 (2007).
119 Dryhurst, supra note 112, at 662.
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accountability, there is debate as to whether such knowing standards will
actually encourage more responsive human trafficking prevention measures
or whether such liability rules will lead to less monitoring activity under the
theory that the less a company monitors its supply chain, the less the
company could be shown to know, decreasing the company’s potential
liability.120
Similar to the ATS pleading issues discussed above, plaintiffs face
significant challenges in pleading factual allegations with sufficient
specificity to state a claim against a corporation alleged to have only
constructive knowledge of a violation under the TVPRA. Courts have found
non-specific allegations attributing knowledge to companies who used
recruiting companies to hire plaintiffs insufficient to state a claim.121
C. The Limitations of “Coercion”
As discussed above, the TVPRA does not extend as far as the Palermo
Protocol in the activity it is defined as capturing. Another example of the
limitations of the TVPRA is in its definition of “coercion” as required to
constitute an actionable claim. It is unclear, and probably unlikely, that the
TVPRA captures much noneconomic political or military activity. The
TVPRA defines “coercion” as:
(A) threats of serious harm or physical restraint against any
person; (B) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a
person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in
serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; or (C)
the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process.122
Under the TVPRA, “severe forms of trafficking in persons” includes
coercion as an actionable element of the “recruitment, harboring,

120

Id. at 663.
Kelsey v. Goldstar Estate Buyers Corp., No. 3:13-CV-00354-HU, 2014 WL 1155253, at
*6 (D. Or. Mar. 21, 2014) (“Whether it is ultimately sufficient to state a claim, it will only be
so if sufficient factual allegations are made of the actual exercise of force, the threats made of
the potential use of force, the physical restraints used or threatened, and what serious harm
actually befell Plaintiffs or was threatened in sufficient detail to demonstrate a violation of the
statutes relied upon.”).
122 22 U.S.C. § 7102 (2013).
121
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transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services.”123
Thus, if a corporation or organization engages in coercion in the pursuit of
obtaining “labor or services,” then a claim could be applicable against the
defendants under the TVPRA.
The interpretation of “labor or services” has received some analysis in
criminal cases brought under the TVPRA.124 The U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York interpreted “labor or services” broadly, relying
on the ordinary meaning of the words; an approach upheld by the Second
Circuit.125 “The ordinary meaning of the term labor is an ‘expenditure of
physical or mental effort especially when fatiguing, difficult, or compulsory.
The term ‘services,’ is defined as ‘useful labor that does not produce a
tangible commodity.’ ”126 Under this definition, “labor or services”
ordinarily means a useful expenditure of physical or mental effort that does
not produce a commodity. This definition could potentially encompass
noneconomic activity such as torture or the arbitrary arrest in Sosa if the
activity was done for the purpose of producing a desired outcome. For
example, obtaining a confession, affecting political behavior, or otherwise
changing a person’s anticipated affirmative behavior to an alternate course
that is beneficial to the offending party could arguably suffice.
Using this admittedly broad understanding of labor and services brought
about by coercion could capture some portion of noneconomic activity no
longer actionable under the ATS. However, this ordinary understanding of
labor and services does not easily apply to political or other behavior that
essentially amounts to inaction. Political acts such as imprisonment to
silence dissent or to punish prior transgressions do not easily fit under the
ordinary meaning of “services.”127

123

Id.
Mattar, supra note 89, at 1267.
125 United States v. Marcus, 487 F. Supp. 2d 289, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), vacated, 538 F.3d
97 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 560 U.S. 258 (2010), and aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded,
628 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2010).
126 Marcus, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 300.
127 There is an argument that obtaining a person or group’s silence and agreement to refrain
from dissent is certainly a beneficial service, especially if the behavior was ongoing prior to
the torture and stopped or encouraged to be stopped by the torture. Proving the absence of a
behavior as a service would be an uphill climb for any plaintiff without clear evidence of the
prior behavior the torturer wished to eliminate or alter.
124
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D. Constitutional Challenges
The TVPRA has been challenged on a number of constitutional claims
alleging overreach of the Commerce Clause, void for vagueness, and Ex Post
Facto grounds.128 As discussed above, courts have generally concluded that
the words of the statute are to be given their ordinary or defined meanings,
defeating most claims of vagueness within the sections of the TVPRA.129
Similarly, claims of congressional overreach under the Commerce Clause
have failed.130 Many cases of forced labor and sex trafficking involve an
international element of moving non-citizens across borders, clearly within
the scope of the Foreign Commerce Clause’s enumerated grant of authority.
The Eleventh Circuit found the TVPRA to be part of a “comprehensive
regulatory scheme” and that activity such as sex trafficking and forced labor
has an “aggregate economic impact on interstate and foreign commerce”
justified under rational basis review.131
However, the TVPRA has been found to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause
of the Constitution.132 Courts have consistently held that conduct from
before the enactment of the TVPRA cannot be the basis of a later claim,
though ongoing conduct begun before the statute’s enactment and continued
thereafter does subject defendants to potential liability under the act.133
Thus, even though the TVPRA has a ten-year statute of limitations,134 the
alleged relevant conduct must have occurred after both the statute was
enacted and after 2008 to take advantage of the plaintiff-friendly
amendments such as extraterritorial jurisdiction, and the addition of those
who knowingly benefit from forced labor as possible defendants.
128

Mattar, supra note 89, at 1275.
Id. at 1281–82.
130 Id. at 1277.
131 United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2007).
132 United States v. Marcus, 538 F.3d 97, 98 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 560 U.S. 258 (2010);
Mattar, supra note 89, at 1275.
133 United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 264 (2010) (“[I]f the jury, which was not
instructed about the TVPA’s enactment date, erroneously convicted Marcus based exclusively
on noncriminal, preenactment conduct, Marcus would have a valid due process claim.”);
Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 994 F. Supp. 2d 831, 840 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (finding the
addition of extraterritorial jurisdiction to the TVPRA in 2008 was substantive and not
procedural and, thus, cannot be applied retroactively); United States v. Jackson, 480 F.3d
1014, 1024 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A]bhorrent conduct does not give us license to ignore the
elements of the criminal statutes that Congress has established.”).
134 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (2008).
129

2016]

A TRUCK STOP INSTEAD OF SAINT PETER’S

475

E. Diplomatic Immunity
The TVPRA does not allow for a cause of action against the conduct of
foreign diplomats in the United States, the most common infraction being
that of domestic servitude.135 The U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia noted, “the TVP[R]A does not override diplomatic immunity.
First, the TVP[R]A is silent as to whether it limits the immunity of
diplomats, and courts should not read a statute to modify the United States’
treaty obligations in the absence of a clear statement from Congress.”136
Long-standing interpretive doctrine supports the idea that legislation
should not be interpreted to “violate the law of nations or an international
agreement to which the United States is a party.”137 Though the TVPRA
does not overcome diplomatic immunity as a remedial matter, the 2008
amendments created the ability of the Secretary of State to suspend the
issuance of A-3 or G-5 visas to those seeking diplomatic work, “if the
Secretary determines that there is credible evidence that 1 or more employees
of such mission or international organization have abused or exploited 1 or
more nonimmigrants holding an A-3 visa or a G-5 visa, and that the
diplomatic mission or international organization tolerated such actions.”138
Additionally, at least one district court has ruled that former diplomats
enjoy residual immunity only for “official acts” and found claims of
trafficking and forced labor to be private, not official acts, and thus subject to
the court’s jurisdiction.139 While not addressing the issue of human rights
violations by diplomats as strongly as it could, the TVPRA does provide the
potential to seek out and address trafficking issues on the front end should
such potential violations become apparent.
V. CASE STUDIES: ATS V. TVPRA
The biggest barrier to amending pleadings alleging a violation of the ATS
to include a TVPRA claim is the possibility that the 2008 amendments do not
135

Mattar, supra note 89, at 1287–88.
Sabbithi v. Al Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122, 130 (D.D.C. 2009).
137 Elizabeth Grant, Comment, Ignoring the Technicality’s Temptation: Interpreting the
Citizenship of A Foreign Official Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2 AM. U. BUS. L.
REV. 389, 406 (2013) (describing the “Charming Betsy” canon).
138 8 U.S.C. § 1375c (2008).
139 Baoanan v. Baja, 627 F. Supp. 2d 155, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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apply retroactively. For that reason, though the facts of some cases seem
better suited to the TVPRA, the statute would not automatically reach action
prior to 2008.140 However, a look into the reasons why some cases were
dismissed under the ATS and an inquiry into how the TVPRA would have
been applied under similar circumstances is still instructive for future
actions.
This section will explore two types of representative cases brought under
the ATS, one economic and one non-economic. Though arguably any action
taken by a corporation is taken for an economic purpose, it is necessary to
separate the activities of labor, including sex trafficking, from activities of a
political nature that companies may take for security purposes. As discussed,
actions beyond sex trafficking captured by the TVPRA likely must be those
taken in the form of traditional labor and services. Such traditional labor and
services are referred to here as economic activity. Non-economic activity, as
used here, is activity of a political or military nature, such as killing or
torture. This non-economic activity is likely not captured within the
TVPRA. This section will compare two cases dismissed under the ATS in
order to examine how the TVPRA could potentially deal with cases of an
economic and non-economic nature.
A. Economic Activity: Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc.
There have been few successful claims against corporations in utilizing
the aiding and abetting theory of liability under the ATS.141 Prior to Kiobel,
these claims could be brought against corporations for human rights
violations in their international supply chain, even if the claims were rarely
successful.142 The theory, however, presented a difficult standard to meet.
Plaintiffs were required to prove the corporation’s purposeful intent “to
engage in conduct that it knew would facilitate or cause serious human rights
violations.”143 To overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality in an
140 It is important to note that only one district court has thus far found the TVPRA’s grant
of extraterritorial jurisdiction to be non-retroactive. See Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 994 F.
Supp. 2d 831, 840 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (finding the addition of extraterritorial jurisdiction to the
TVPRA in 2008 was substantive and not procedural and thus cannot be applied retroactively).
141 Naomi Jiyoung Bang, Justice for Victims of Human Trafficking and Forced Labor: Why
Current Theories of Corporate Liability Do Not Work, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 1047, 1055–65
(2013).
142 Id. at 1056.
143 Id. at 1057.
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aiding and abetting claim under the ATS, courts require this showing of
purposeful human rights abuses by corporations, as opposed to only
knowledge of the activity.144 In one case, the court stated that the defendants
were alleged to have “acted purposefully in violating [an international
agreement], but merely knowingly in aiding and abetting the underlying
violations of the law of nations.”145
In Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., three former child slaves of the cocoa
industry in Cote d’Ivoire argued an aiding and abetting child slavery theory
under the ATS against Nestle USA (Nestle), Cargill Incorporated Company,
and Cargill Cocoa.146 In addition to the well-known human rights violations
related to the cocoa trade in West Africa, the plaintiffs alleged the three
corporate defendants had first-hand knowledge of child slavery in Cote
d’Ivoire gained through “numerous visits” to the farms.147 The district court
dismissed the complaint, finding “that corporations cannot be sued under the
ATS, and that even if they could, the plaintiffs failed to allege the elements
of a claim for aiding and abetting slave labor.”148 “Although the defendants
do not own cocoa farms themselves, they maintain and protect a steady
supply of cocoa by forming exclusive buyer/seller relationships with Ivorian
farms” and import most of this cocoa into the United States.149 Through
financial and technical support, including training on appropriate labor
practices, “the defendants effectively control the production of Ivorian
cocoa.”150 Additionally, the court noted the defendants’ active lobbying
efforts to oppose a 2001 bill that would have required such U.S. importers
and manufacturers to certify their products as “slave free.”151 An industrysupported “voluntary enforcement system” was adopted instead.152
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs in Doe I were granted leave to amend their
complaint to attempt to state the elements of an aiding and abetting claim
under the ATS in light of the Kiobel ruling.153

144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153

Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 192–93 (2d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 193 (emphasis in original).
766 F.3d 1013, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1017.
Id. at 1018.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1028–29.

478

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 44:451

As discussed above, such an aiding and abetting theory requires the
showing of purposeful intent to commit human rights violations. By
contrast, the TVPRA requires only a reckless disregard of the fact that forced
labor was used in a venture in which the defendant benefitted financially. 154
This standard would seem to be met in Doe I according to the facts relied
upon by the court. The companies provided training and financial support on
site and actively lobbied against measures designed to curtail such slave
labor. This indicates that the defendants at least should have known of the
conditions in which the plaintiffs worked. The labor at issue also seems to
easily meet the definition of forced labor and coercion under the TVPRA.155
The heightened standard required in an aiding and abetting claim under
the ATS is necessary to overcome the presumption against extraterritorial
jurisdiction. As previously discussed, the TVPRA has been amended to
provide extraterritorial jurisdiction explicitly; thus no heightened standard is
required. The TVPRA is perhaps most useful in these types of cases which
involve economic activity where victims are actually engaged in labor that
financially benefits the company. A much more difficult case arises when
the company benefits financially not from a person’s labor, but from their
death.
B. Noneconomic Activity: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
In Kiobel, the petitioners were residents of Ogoniland, Nigeria in the
1990s, when the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC)
was conducting oil exploration in the area.156 Residents of Ogoniland
protested the environmental impact of the SPDC’s activities and the SPDC
responded by enlisting the support of the Nigerian Government.157

154

18 U.S.C. § 1589(b) (2008).
Doe I, 766 F.3d at 1017 (“The plaintiffs in this case . . . were forced to work on Ivorian
cocoa plantations for up to fourteen hours per day six days a week, given only scraps of food
to eat, and whipped and beaten by overseers. They were locked in small rooms at night and
not permitted to leave the plantations, knowing that children who tried to escape would be
beaten or tortured. Plaintiff John Doe II witnessed guards cut open the feet of children who
attempted to escape, and John Doe III knew that guards forced failed escapees to drink
urine.”).
156 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662–63 (2013).
157 Id.
155
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Throughout the early 1990’s, the complaint alleges, Nigerian
military and police forces attacked Ogoni villages, beating,
raping, killing, and arresting residents and destroying or looting
property. Petitioners further allege that respondents aided and
abetted these atrocities by, among other things, providing the
Nigerian forces with food, transportation, and compensation, as
well as by allowing the Nigerian military to use respondents’
property as a staging ground for attacks.158
As discussed above, the U.S. Supreme Court did not reach the merits of
this aiding and abetting claim under the ATS.159 Instead, the Court
unanimously agreed that the ATS did not apply extraterritorially, leaving for
another day the question of whether the ATS may be applied to corporations
and states.160
As previously noted, the TVPRA is expressly extraterritorial, which
would have provided jurisdiction over the activities occurring outside the
United States. Additionally, the extraterritorial jurisdiction applies if “an
alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the nationality
of the alleged offender.”161 Royal Dutch Shell is the parent corporation of
Shell Oil Company in the United States.162 As the third largest company in
the world, finding personal jurisdiction over Royal Dutch Shell would be
unlikely to present a problem.163
Beyond jurisdictional issues, however, the more relevant question is this:
could a person’s death be considered a “service” of that person, where a
company benefits financially from that person’s death? In the case of
Kiobel, the nearby population was killed for engaging in protests. A lack of
protests would present a financial benefit to a company in the form of added
stability and security. Using the only interpretation of “labor and services”
under the TVPRA given by a district court, the term “services” means a
useful expenditure of physical or mental effort that does not produce a

158
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Id.
Id. at 1669.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1596.
About Us: Who We Are, http://www.shell.com/abouthpus/wo-we-are.html.
Global 500, FORTUNE (2015), http://fortune.com/global500/.
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commodity.164 Arguably, a person’s death is an ultimate and complete
expenditure of physical or mental effort. The killing of a person expends all
future mental or physical ability from that person. The benefit derived by the
company is due to the omission of an act of protest, as opposed to the
standard economic benefit derived from a comissive act of labor. Thus, to
financially benefit from the killing of others in order to obtain their labor and
services, including the omission of disruptive acts, would be a violation of
the TVPRA.
The most glaring problem with this argument is in the tortured reasoning
required to articulate it. The fact of the matter is that Congress did not
explicitly define forced labor to include such widespread killing in the
interests of corporate security. The inclusion of more severe criminal
penalties for instances of coercion that cause death only highlights the fact
that Congress knew how to include such a provision had they so chosen.165
This glaring loophole in the TVPRA and also under the ATS post-Kiobel
creates the perverse outcome that a company is less likely to face liability in
the United States for killing a large population of people than they are for
enslaving that same population.166
VI. CONCLUSION
Civil actions under the TVPRA have been the source of some criticism
and very little success since the enactment of the 2008 amendments. There
is currently a significant shortage of case law regarding the civil remedy. At
the time of this writing, fewer than 100 cases have published rulings or
orders since 2008, and of those, only nine have produced summary or default
judgments in favor of the plaintiff and none have been fully litigated at
trial.167 Civil actions under the TVPRA are expensive and time-consuming
164 United States v. Marcus, 487 F. Supp. 2d 289, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), vacated, 538 F.3d
97 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 560 U.S. 258 (2010), and aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded,
628 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2010).
165 18 U.S.C. § 1589(d).
166 Though not the subject of this Note, in light of Kiobel, the TVPRA should be amended to
expressly include such widespread violence, whether or not it provides actual labor.
167 Dlamini v. Babb, No. 1:13-CV-2699-WSD, 2014 WL 5761118, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 5,
2014) (summary judgment); Frankenfield v. Strong, No. 2:12-00054, 2014 WL 1234709, at *6
(M.D. Tenn. Mar. 25, 2014) (default judgment); Francisco v. Susano, No. 10-CV-00332CMA-MEH, 2013 WL 4849109, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept. 10, 2013) (default judgment); Carazani
v. Zegarra, 972 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2013) (default judgment); Lainez v. Baltazar, No.
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to litigate, especially suits alleging extraterritorial violations. Criticism of
the TVPRA as less comprehensive than the Palermo Protocol is valid; the
statute is far from perfect in many respects. Perhaps the most salient
criticism of the TVPRA is that it would not directly capture the conduct at
issue in Kiobel, Sosa, or Mohamed, which all involved infractions that were
ostensibly of a political, military, or otherwise non-economic nature.
However, in light of the specific limitations found in civil suits alleging
violations of the ATS, there is a path forward for litigation able to argue at
least purposeful coercion through the civil remedy provision and expanded
causes of action of the TVPRA. Even in light of its limitations, the TVPRA
could address a broad array of human rights violations, affecting millions of
victims around the world that are beyond the current scope of the ATS.

5:11-CV-00167-BR, 2013 WL 3288369, at *2 (E.D.N.C. June 28, 2013) (default judgment);
Magnifico v. Villanueva, No. 10-CV-80771, 2012 WL 5395026, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 2,
2012) (default judgment); Doe v. Howard, No. 1:11CV1105 (LO/TRJ), 2012 WL 3834930, at
*1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 7, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:11-CV-1105, 2012
WL 3834929 (E.D. Va. Sept. 4, 2012) (default judgment); Canal v. Dann, No. 09-03366 CW,
2010 WL 3491136, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010) amended, No. 09-03366 CW, 2011 WL
3903166 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011) (default judgment); Samirah v. Sabhnani, 772 F. Supp. 2d
437, 452 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (summary judgment).

